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INTRODUCTION
In our federal court system, prospective jurors who have been
convicted of a felony are statutorily excluded from jury service for life.1
In support of this categorical exclusion, lawmakers and courts allege
that those convicted of a felony, threaten the jury process principally

† Dr. James M. Binnall is an Associate Professor of Law, Criminology, and Criminal
Justice at California State University, Long Beach. He is also a formerly incarcerated person
and a member of the State Bar of California–his experiences inform this article.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5); see generally United States v. Hefner, 842 F.2d 731 (4th Cir.
1988); Viverito v. Levi, 395 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (suggesting no automatic restoration of civil rights); but see United States v. Green, 532 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Mass. 2005)
(suggesting that automatic restoration under state law will satisfy the restoration of civil
rights under federal law); Walker v. United States, 800 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2015) (suggesting
that unless civil rights have been restored, then the right to serve on a jury can be lost).
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because they lack character.2 Federal courts have suggested that our
federal jury system permanently excludes citizens with a felony criminal
record for fear that if allowed to serve, they would undermine the
functioning and integrity of the federal jury process.3 Or, stated
differently, those with a felony conviction assumedly cannot meet the
standard for juror fitness set by the juror’s oath used in federal criminal
proceedings.4 Accordingly, the argument goes, only permanent
exclusion can truly protect the federal jury system,5 though critics
question whether exclusion actually insulates the jury from corrupting
influence.6
Legal challenges to federal record-based juror exclusion have never
met with success.7 Cross-section claims routinely fail because courts
refuse to classify prospective jurors with a felony conviction as a
distinct class.8 Additionally, no court has struck down the practice of
2 See Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65,
73-74 (2003); James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There Empirical Support for Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service, 36 L. & POL’Y 1 (2014)
[hereinafter A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased]; see also Hale v. Shoop, No. 1:18cv-504, 2021 WL 1215793, at *19 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 31, 2021) (citing United States v.
Green, 995 F. 2d 793 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting “the exclusion from juror eligibility of persons
charged with a felony is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose[s] of guaranteeing the probity of jurors . . . [and] of creating a pool of jurors likely to give unbiased
consideration to the evidence presented.”).
3 See Kalt, supra note 2, at 74 (“[F]elon exclusion is meant to define and protect juries
rather than to punish or degrade felons.”).
4 See FED. JUD. CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 247 (4th ed. 1996)
(listing the recommended juror oath in federal criminal trials as, “Do each of you solemnly
swear [or affirm] that you will well and truly try, and a true deliverance make in, the case
now on trial, and render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence, so help you
God?” and listing the recommended juror oath in federal civil proceedings as, “Do each of
you solemnly swear [or affirm] that you will well and truly try the matters in issue now on
trial and render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence, so help you God?”).
5 See Kalt, supra note 2, at 169 (characterizing the exclusion of those with a felony
conviction from jury service as an attempt by “those who distrust felons to achieve perfect
moral cleansing”).
6 Kalt discusses the under-inclusiveness charge against record-based juror exclusion:
Assume hypothetically that 95% of felons lack probity, that just 10% of non-felons
do, and that only felons–all felons–are excluded from juries. If 6.5% of the juryage population are felons, then over 60% of those who are unfit to serve would be
non-felons who are not excluded. If anything, this hypothetical is extremely conservative.
See id. at 102.
7 See Kalt, supra note 2, at 70; see also JAMES M. BINNALL, TWENTY MILLION ANGRY
MEN: THE CASE FOR INCLUDING CONVICTED FELONS IN OUR JURY SYSTEM 58-64 (2021)
(providing a comprehensive examination of prior legal challenges to record-based juror exclusion statutes).
8 See Kalt, supra note 2, at 75 n.34 (compiling cases in which cross-section challenges
to record-based juror exclusion failed); James M. Binnall, Sixteen Million Angry Men: Re-
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excluding those with felony conviction from jury service on equal
protection grounds.9 Record-based juror exclusion statutes must meet
only the state-deferential rational basis standard, as jury service is not a
fundamental right and individuals with a felony criminal history are not
a protected class.10 Though a smattering of other potential legal claims
have been proposed, none have prevailed.11 In sum, federal courts have
been entirely unreceptive to legal challenges to record based juror
exclusion. As one court recently put it, “the reasons for movants’
challenge to this provision are beyond our comprehension.”12
While litigants have been unsuccessful challenging record-based
juror exclusion, the policy case against the practice is strong. Empirical
research undermines the character justification,13 and suggests that
exclusion is likely to have negative impacts on excluded jurors,14
juries,15 and communities.16 Moreover, federal record-based juror
viving a Dead Doctrine to Challenge the Constitutionality of Excluding Felons from Jury
Service, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 18 (2009) [hereinafter Sixteen Million Angry Men]
(“Establishing felons as a ‘distinctive group’ for the purpose of supporting a fair crosssection claim has proven impossible for litigants . . . though felons almost certainly meet the
ambiguous legal interpretation of ‘distinctiveness,’ no litigant has prevailed in a fair crosssection claim.”); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (establishing the distinctiveness test for cross-section claims).
9 See Kalt, supra note 2, at 88 n.101 (compiling cases in which cross-section challenges to record-based juror exclusion failed); see BINNALL, TWENTY MILLION ANGRY MEN, supra note 7, at 62-64.
10 See also United States v. Conant, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1022 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (holding that jury service is not a fundamental right and those with a felony conviction are not a
protected class).
11 See Kalt, supra note 2, at 70; see also Binnall, Sixteen Million Angry Men, supra note
8.
12 Hale, 2021 WL 1215793, at *19.
13 See generally BINNALL, TWENTY MILLION ANGRY MEN, supra note 7, at ch. 2; James
M. Binnall, Jury Diversity in the Age of Mass Incarceration: An Exploratory Mock Jury Experiment Examining Felon-Jurors’ Potential Impacts on Deliberations, 25 PSYCH., CRIME &
L. 345 (2018) [hereinafter Jury Diversity in the Age of Mass Incarceration]; James M. Binnall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance: Convicted Felons’ Perspectives on Jury Service, 43
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 4 (2018) [hereinafter Summonsing Criminal Desistance]; James M. Binnall, A Jury of None: An Essay on the Last Acceptable Form of Civic Banishment, 34
DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 533 (2010) [hereinafter A Jury of None]; James M. Binnall, A
‘Meaningful’ Seat at the Table: Contemplating Our Ongoing Struggle to Access Democracy,
73 S. M. U. L. REV. F. 35 (2020) [hereinafter A Meaningful Seat at the Table]; James M.
Binnall, Convicts in Court: Felonious Lawyers Make a Case for Including Convicted Felons
in the Jury Pool, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1379 (2010) [hereinafter Convicts in Court].
14 See Binnall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance, supra note 13, at 7-8.
15 See Binnall, Jury Diversity in the Age of Mass Incarceration, supra note 13, at 34748.
16 See James M. Binnall, Exorcising Presumptions: Judges and Attorneys Contemplate
‘Felon-Juror Inclusion’ in Maine, 39 JUST. SYS. J. 378 (2018) [hereinafter Exorcising Presumptions]; James M. Binnall, Felon-Jurors in Vacationland: A Field Study of Transforma-
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exclusion is inconsistent with how the law employs character
assessments in a host of other contexts.17 While those with a felony
criminal conviction are forever barred from federal jury service because
their conviction assumedly signals an irreparable flaw of character, in
many other contexts the law accommodates the possibility that character
is alterable, such that those with a felony criminal history are able to
demonstrate character rehabilitation.18 These inconsistent conceptualizations of character strongly suggest that the primary purpose for
excluding those with a felony criminal history from the federal jury pool
is largely pretense—possibly disguising a more insidious motive for
banishment.
On January 16, 2020, former President Donald John Trump’s
(hereinafter “former President Trump”) first impeachment trial began.19
Twenty days later, the U.S. Senate acquitted former President Trump of
abuse of power and obstruction of Congress. This was in connection
with his alleged efforts to sway Ukrainian President Zelensky to
investigate possible criminal wrongdoings of his political opponent’s
family member.20 The final vote tally split almost exactly along party
lines, with only one Republican Senator, Mitt Romney (R) of Utah,
voting to convict.21 Roughly a year later, on February 13, 2021, former
President Trump’s second impeachment trial came to a close.22 In that
case, decided after President Biden assumed office, the Senate acquitted
former President Trump on the charge of incitement of insurrection,
tive Civic Engagement in Maine, 71 ME. L. REV. 71 passim (2019) [hereinafter Felon-Jurors
in Vacationland]; James M. Binnall, Cops and Convicts: An Exploratory Field Study of Jurymandering, 16 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 221, 226, 232-33 (2018) [hereinafter Cops and Convicts]; see also James M. Binnall & Nick Petersen, Building Biased Jurors: Exposing the
Circularity of the Inherent Bias Rationale for Felon-Juror Exclusion, 27 PSYCHIATRY,
PSYCH. & L. 110, 120 (2020) [hereinafter Building Biased Jurors].
17 See infra Part II.A; see generally BINNALL, TWENTY MILLION ANGRY MEN, supra
note 7, at ch. 2.
18 See Binnall, Convicts in Court, supra note 13, at 1388-89 (cataloguing jurisdictions in
which a person with a felony conviction is permanently excluded from jury service but is
permitted to join the bar and practice law).
19 See Jeremy Herb, Senate Impeachment Trial of Donald Trump Officially Begins, CNN
POL. (Jan. 16, 2020, 5:05 PM), https://perma.cc/UT6J-3W4N; Jennifer Haberkorn et al.,
Chief Justice, Senators Sworn in as Senate Begins Historic Impeachment Trial of Trump,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2020, 3:52 PM), https://perma.cc/N6TM-DE8Y.
20 See Philip Ewing, President Trump Impeached by the House in Historic Rebuke, NPR
(Dec. 18, 2019, 8:34 PM), https://perma.cc/5APV-CBXJ.
21 See Ian Millhiser, Mitt Romney Just Did Something that Literally No Senator Has
Ever Done Before, VOX (Feb. 5, 2020, 4:25 PM), https://perma.cc/X5KP-JRMG (noting that
Senator Romney voted to convict only on Article I – Abuse of Power, but also voted to acquit on Article II – Obstruction of Congress).
22 See Caroline Linton et al., Senate Votes to Acquit Trump in Historic Second Impeachment Trial, CBS NEWS (Feb. 14, 2021, 7:41 AM), https://perma.cc/J8DE-NFQN.
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stemming from his alleged contributions to the attack on the U.S.
Capital on January 6, 2021.23 Once again, the Senate vote was largely a
partisan exercise, as only seven Republican Senators voted to convict.24
Ahead of each impeachment trial for former President Trump, a
number of U.S. Senators expressly stated their intended verdict
preference.25 For Senate Minority Whip Dick Durbin (D) of Illinois, the
Senators’ statements seemed to undermine their role as neutral arbiters
of facts in impeachment proceedings.26 Similarly, as Senator Susan
Collins (R) of Maine noted, “At the very beginning of the trial we take
an oath to render impartial justice. If you announce ahead of time how
you’re going to vote, I don’t see how you can render impartial justice
before you’ve heard the evidence.”27 Nonetheless, all were permitted to
cast a ballot. No exclusions or sanctions were levied against those
Senators who, through their statements and actions, outwardly ignored
their oath to render impartial justice in an impeachment trial.28
This article argues that by predetermining their verdict preference
prior to the presentation of evidence–thereby publicly flouting the
impeachment process–a number of U.S. Senators strengthened the
contextual case for lifting the lifetime exclusion on federal jurors with a
felony criminal history. In particular, their actions and words seem to
make clear that a lack of character (the principal rationale cited in
support of federal record-based juror exclusion) has little to do with
23

Id.; see also Zachary Cohen et al., Senate Report Reveals New Details About Security
Failures Ahead of January 6 Attack but Omits Trump’s Role, CNN POL. (June 8, 2021, 8:45
AM), https://perma.cc/8HKU-CFCR; Katelyn Polantz, Former Top Capital Riot Prosecutor
Says ‘Maybe the President is Culpable’ When Asked About Trump, CNN POL. (Mar. 22,
2021, 12:29 AM), https://perma.cc/BW9T-TEMG.
24 Barbara Sprunt, 7 GOP Senators Voted to Convict Trump. Only 1 Faces Voters Next
Year, NPR (Feb. 15, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/W8N4-EZKM (noting that Republican Senators who voted to convict were: Senators Burr–NC, Cassidy–LA, Collins–ME,
Murkowski–AK, Romney–UT, Sasse–NE, and Toomey–PA).
25 See infra Part III; see, e.g., Elex Michaelson, Sen. Warren Says She’d Vote to Convict
President Trump, FOX 11 L.A., https://perma.cc/LY8J-DXUS (last modified Oct. 5, 2019);
Naomi Lim & Joseph Simonson, Elizabeth Warren Says She’s Seen Enough Evidence to
Convict Trump in Senate Impeachment Trial, WASH. EXAM’R (Oct. 4, 2019, 6:56 PM),
https://perma.cc/75NN-U59F.
26 See, e.g., Veronica Stracqualursi, Durbin: Senators Have ‘Gone Too Far’ in Saying
How They Will Vote Before Impeachment Trial Has Begun, CNN POL. (Dec. 22, 2019, 11:55
AM), https://perma.cc/Z3UB-93GX.
27 Jon Chrisos, ‘Senate Must Do Its Constitutional Duty’: Sen. Collins Expects Impeachment Trial, WGME (Jan. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/D3YF-7Z64.
28 See RULES OF PROC. & PRACT. IN THE S. WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACHMENT TRIALS, S.
DOC. NO. 116-1, at 218 (2d Sess. 2020) (“I solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be)
that in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of ——— ———, now pending, I will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws: So help me God.”);
see also infra Part III.
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juror fitness or the appearance of impropriety. Accordingly, Parts I and
II further consider the concept of character, detailing the law’s
inconsistent view of character that is wholly context specific. Part III
discusses the impeachment trials of former President Trump, focusing
on the role of U.S. Senators as jurors and how many openly disregarded
their oath to do impartial justice in advance of those trials. Finally, Part
IV concludes by suggesting that federal record-based juror exclusion
laws ought to be lifted, as they adhere to an antiquated conception of
character that is contradicted by empirical evidence and made
nonsensical when considered in other contexts–namely in impeachment
proceedings.
I. THE CONTOURS OF THE CHARACTER JUSTIFICATION
All but one U.S. jurisdiction (Maine) restricts juror eligibility for
those citizens with a felony criminal history.29 In some jurisdictions,
record-based juror exclusion is temporary, allowing for the possibility
that an individual with a felony criminal conviction can, at some point,
serve as a juror.30 For example, in 13 states, those with a felony
conviction are ineligible for jury service until the completion of their
sentence (including any term of probation or parole).31 An additional
eight states (and the District of Columbia) enforce hybrid exclusions that
can turn on penal status, charge category, type of jury proceeding,
and/or a term of years since conviction,32 while two states allow for
lifetime challenges-for-cause for any prospective juror with a felony
criminal history.33
Conversely, in 27 jurisdictions, record-based juror restrictions are
permanent, barring prospective jurors with a felony criminal conviction
from serving for life.34 One such permanent exclusion jurisdiction is our
federal court system.35 Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1865(b)(5), a prospective
29

BINNALL, TWENTY MILLION ANGRY MEN, supra note 7, at app. A.
See id.
31 Id. The 13 states are Alaska, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin.
32 Id. The eight states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Oregon.
33 Id. The two states are Illinois and Iowa. A challenge-for-cause is one made by either
party to litigation claiming that prospective jurors cannot execute their duties faithfully and
impartially.
34 Id. The jurisdictions are Federal, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
35 See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5).
30
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federal juror is qualified to serve on a grand or petit jury, “[U]nless he
. . . has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been
convicted in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been
restored.”36 Like many record-based juror exclusion statutes, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1865(b)(5) does not distinguish felony or litigation type.37
Thus, in the federal system, anyone convicted of any prior felony is
categorically ineligible to serve on either a criminal or civil jury for
life.38
A) Defining the Character Rationale: Two Perspectives
In support of this permanent exclusion, federal courts consistently
cite a perceived lack of character as the primary purpose for the
practice.39 Still, courts are less consistent in their explanations as to how
character makes one unfit for jury service. Two possible interpretations
of the character rationale exist.40
Under the first, a lack of character impacts the functioning of the
jury, such that one with a conviction would presumably somehow
undermine the jury process. And while courts have been vague as to the
exact mechanism by which character makes one unfit for service, one

36

Id.
Binnall and Davis state:
Across jurisdictions, the application of felon-juror exclusion statutes is relatively
consistent. Only four jurisdictions tailor felon-juror exclusion statutes, distinguishing first-time offenders from repeat offenders (Arizona), violent offenders from
non-violent offenders (Nevada), grand juries from petit juries (Colorado), and civil
cases from criminal cases (Oregon). In all remaining jurisdictions, felon-juror exclusion statutes are categorical, applying to all prospective jurors with a prior felony conviction in all types of proceedings.
James M. Binnall & Lauren M. Davis, Californians with a Felony Conviction Are Now Eligible for Jury Service: How Would They Know?, 32 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6 (2020).
38 Id.
39 The court notes here:
The important point is, though, that simply being charged with a crime says something about a person, something which is material to his ability to serve as a juror . . . . It is rational to believe that such a person may not take seriously his obligation to follow the law as a juror is sworn to do.
See United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“It is not their ‘bias’ that disables them. The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (the Act), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1878, excluded felons to
preserve the ‘probity’ of the jury.”).
40 See Kalt, supra note 2, at 74 (“[C]ourts have been less clear as to whether the threat
that felons pose to jury probity stems from their degraded status or from their actual characteristics.”); see also BINNALL, TWENTY MILLION ANGRY MEN, supra note 7, at 76 (referring
to these two perspectives as the “instrumental” and “taint” perspectives respectively).
37
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possible concern is the refusal to abide by the juror’s oath.41 As one
federal court noted, “[Si]mply being charged with a crime says
something about a person, something which is material to his ability to
serve as a juror . . . it is rational to believe that such a person may not
take seriously his obligation to follow the law as a juror is sworn to
do.”42
A second perspective holds that the inclusion of those with a felony
conviction would delegitimize the jury process.43 This “taint
argument”44 seemingly suggests that those with a felony criminal
conviction would undermine the public’s confidence in the jury system
and would lead to skepticism of resulting verdicts.45 As one state court
held, “[It] would be a strange system, indeed, which permitted those
who had been convicted of anti-social and dissolute conduct to serve on
its juries.”46 Similarly, the Southern District of Iowa ruled that federal
record-based juror exclusion is “rationally related to the purpose of
trying to achieve a reputable and reliable jury . . . whose judgment
society can respect.”47
Despite the ambiguity regarding the true purpose of the character
justification for federal record-based juror exclusion, the underlying
assumptions of the rationale are clear. By premising record-based juror
exclusion on a supposed lack of character, a jurisdiction presumes (1)
that a felony conviction uniformly reveals bad character, such that those
with a felony criminal conviction possess a character flaw that makes
them unfit for jury service.48 In turn, when excluding based on a
supposed character flaw, a jurisdiction must also presume (2) that
character is a fixed concept, such that the character of an individual with
a felony criminal history is forever marred and unchanging–warranting
exclusion as a prophylactic measure to protect our jury system.49 These

41

See Barry, 71 F.3d at 1273.
Id. (emphasis added).
43 Kalt writes:
The other possibility broached above is that felons threaten the probity of the jury
because of their degraded status; whether or not individual felons are “bad,” the
idea of having tainted people on juries might undermine the integrity of the institution. That this is anyone’s intention is belied by the fact that jurisdictions speak of
probity rather than the appearance of probity. Nevertheless, it is an argument
worth considering.
See Kalt, supra note 2, at 104.
44 Id. (labeling this argument the “taint” argument).
45 Id.
46 People ex rel. Hannon v. Ryan, 34 A.D.2d 393, 398 (4th Dep’t 1970).
47 Greene, 995 F.2d at 796.
48 See BINNALL, TWENTY MILLION ANGRY MEN, supra note 7, at 75-76.
49 Id.
42
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assumptions adhere to an outdated concept of character that is
contradicted by empirical research and other character requirements
employed in the law.50
B) Two Conceptions of Character: Conventionalists vs. Empiricists
The concept of character and its role as a barometer for assessing
the quality or fitness of an individual has been the topic of extensive
debate.51 On one hand, conventional Aristotelian conceptualizations
suggest that character is fixed, revealed through actions freely taken.52
On the other hand, a modern, empirical view suggests that character is
malleable, shaped in part by our surroundings and our interactions with
those surroundings.53 Federal record-based juror exclusion takes a
decidedly pre-modern view of character development and character
consistency.54
The conventional view of character aligns with Aristotle’s view
that human beings decide their character and reveal their character
through their actions. In describing this conceptualization of character,
one commentator notes, “[E]very person chooses to develop good or bad
character through autonomous actions . . . [and] [o]nce a person
[chooses] their character . . . he or she [is] not free to simply undo the
choice.”55 In this way, the traditionalist’s perspective deemphasizes
social and contextual determinants of one’s character.56 Described as
“globalism” by philosophers,57 such a position proposes not only that
50

See infra Part II.A.
See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J.
491 passim (1985) [hereinafter Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential]; see
also Deborah L. Rhode, Virtue and the Law: The Good Moral Character Requirement in
Occupational Licensing, Bar Regulation, and Immigration Proceedings, 43 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 1027 passim (2018) [hereinafter Rhode, Virtue and the Law].
52 Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the
Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1028
(2004).
53 The empirical challenge to conventional or traditional views (views assumed by virtue ethicists) of character is sometimes termed the Harman-Doris thesis. See generally Gilbert Harman, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error, 99 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 315 (1999); Gilbert Harman, The
Nonexistence of Character Traits, 100 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 223 (2000); Gilbert Harman, Skepticism About Character Traits, 13 J. ETHICS 235 (2009); JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF
CHARACTER: PERSONALITY AND MORAL BEHAVIOR 22 (2002).
54 See BINNALL, TWENTY MILLION ANGRY MEN, supra note 7, at 89.
55 Yankah, supra note 52, at 1028.
56 Id.
57 DORIS, supra note 53, at 22-23 (defining globalism as a theory that “construe[s] personality as more or less coherent and integrated with reliable, relatively situation-resistant,
behavioral implications”).
51
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character is intrinsically formed, but also that character is consistent and
predictable.58 Clarifying this position, philosopher John Doris explains,
“If a person possesses a trait, that person will engage in trait-relevant
behaviors in trait-relevant eliciting conditions with markedly above
chance probability.”59 In this way, character assessments can be useful,
as “[k]nowing something about a person’s character is supposed to
render their behavior intelligible and help observers determine what
behaviors to expect.”60
Unlike the traditionalist view of character, the empirical view
places appropriate weight on situational factors when evaluating the
development of character.61 Under this view, human beings do not
possess a global “dispositional structure.”62 Rather, character is shaped
by human experiences.63 In this way, many commentators argue,
“[P]hilosophical explanations referencing character traits are generally
inferior to those adduced from experimental social psychology . . .
[because] [t]hey presuppose the existence of character structures that
actual people do not very often possess.”64
The social psychological evidence of character determinants is
compelling. An extensive line of research now demonstrates that our
character is largely a byproduct of context.65 For example, in the now
famous Milgram Experiment and Stanford Prison Project, researchers
were able to manipulate experimental environments to elicit incredible
behaviors from respondents otherwise not predisposed to cruelty or
violence.66 Multiple additional studies have found similar effects.67 As
law professor Anders Kaye explains:
Because we are so vulnerable to situational influences, our
characters cannot be as consistent as we generally imagine they
58

See id.
Id. at 23.
60 Id. at 5.
61 See Jonathan Webber, Character, Common-Sense, and Expertise, 10 ETHICAL
THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 89, 90 (2007) (“Philosophical talk of character should be grounded
in the findings of experimental psychology, critics argue, but is instead usually based ultimately only on common-sense intuitions.”).
62 DORIS, supra note 53, at 26.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 6.
65 See Anders Kaye, Does Situationist Psychology Have Radical Implications for Criminal Responsibility?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 611, 637 (2008).
66 See generally Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCH. 371 (1963); Craig Haney & Phillip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S.
Prison Policy: Twenty-five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 AM. PSYCH. 709
(1998); Stanley Milgram, The Perils of Obedience, 247 HARPER’S MAG. 62 (1973).
67 See Kaye, supra note 65 for a review of additional studies.
59
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are . . . [t]he story of my act shifts from being a story about me
to being a story about my surroundings, so that my acts belong,
in some significant way, to forces beyond myself.68
Unlike conventional views of character, this empirically informed
conceptualization accommodates the possibility of reformation and
rehabilitation.69 A traditional perspective of character does not.70 On this
note, empirical evidence tends to show that those who have committed a
serious criminal offense can perform admirably as jurors.71 Moreover, a
closer look at how the law uses character assessments reveals an
inconsistent conception of character, calling into question the law’s
dedication to character as an apt measure of juror fitness.72
II. THE CASE AGAINST THE CHARACTER JUSTIFICATION
As noted, the character justification for federal record-based juror
exclusion presumes preliminarily that those who commit a criminal
offense reveal themselves to be of unacceptable character. In this way, a
single deviation from recognized law is seen as a window into one’s
moral composition.73
A) The Empirical Evidence: A Clear Lack of Support
No empirical evidence supports the character justification.74 As to
the “instrumental” perspective, evidence makes clear that jurors with a
felony criminal conviction pose little threat to the jury’s function.75
In the only mock jury experiment to include both jurors with a
felony criminal history and jurors with no criminal convictions, results
revealed that such jurors approached service thoughtfully and

68

Id. at 639.
See Nisigandha Bhuyan, The Role of Character in Ethical Decision-Making, 41 J.
VALUE INQUIRY 45, 49 (2007).
70 Id. at 45-46 (“Character concerns an appropriate inner state of an individual, which
gives rise to an appropriate response in terms of behavior, action, and decision to any given
situation. Hence, a character trait is a broad-based disposition to respond in a relevant manner to situations of corresponding sort.”).
71 See Binnall, Jury Diversity in the Age of Mass Incarceration, supra note 13; Binnall,
Summonsing Criminal Desistance, supra note 13.
72 See infra Part II. B. See generally BINNALL, TWENTY MILLION ANGRY MEN, supra
note 7, at ch. 2.
73 See DORIS, supra note 53, at 20 (“Moreover, attribution of negatively valanced traits
may require very little in the way of behavioral consistency; perhaps one does not have to
reliably falter, but only sporadically falter, to be counted a coward.”).
74 See Binnall, Felon-Jurors in Vacationland, supra note 16, at 3.
75 See generally Binnall, Criminal Desistance, supra note 13; Binnall, Exorcising Presumptions, supra note 16.
69
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conscientiously.76 On theoretically derived measures of deliberation
quality, participants with a felony conviction outperformed their nonconviction counterparts. They raised more novel case facts during
deliberations and spoke for a greater proportion of their jury’s total
deliberation time.77 In this way, participants with a felony criminal
history added value to their jury’s deliberative process, drawing on their
past to impartially assess evidence and to evenhandedly apply the law.
These findings support a number of prior studies on juries,78 and outside
of the jury context, 79 suggesting that diverse work groups tend to
engage in higher quality deliberations than homogeneous groups.
Similarly, in a study of former jurors with a felony criminal
conviction in Maine, all reported approaching jury service in a
thoughtful way, placing a tremendous amount of importance on the role
of the juror and their ability to fulfill that role.80 Study respondents
reported taking an active role in deliberations, striving to live up to the
trust placed in them by the state.81 Many spoke of serving as a
“corroboration of their reformation.”82 in their eyes creating a
tremendous responsibility that they felt a duty to fulfill.83 These findings
squarely contradict presumptions that a criminal conviction forever
76

See Binnall, Juror Diversity in the Age of Mass Incarceration, supra note 13, at 13.
Id.
78 See generally Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 74 UNIV. S. CAL.
L. REV. 659 (2002); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision-Making:
Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 597 (2006); see, e.g., Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 53 (1984).
79 See generally Warren Watson et al., Cultural Diversity’s Impact on Interaction Process and Performance: Comparing Homogeneous and Diverse Task Groups, 36 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 590 (1993); Poppy McLeod et al., Ethnic Diversity and Creativity in Small
Groups, 27 SMALL GRP. RSCH. 248 (1996); Victor Valls et al., Linking Educational Diversity
and Team Performance: Team Communication Quality and Innovation Team Climate Matter, 89 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORG. PSYCH. 751 (2016).
80 See Binnall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance, supra note 13, at 36.
81 See, e.g., id. at 11 (“I figured, you know, they gave me the trust enough to sit on this
jury, to do what had to be done, whether it was guilty or not guilty.”).
82 Id. at 15.
83 This was reflected in the following study respondent’s comment:
I mean [felon jury inclusion] kinda sends a message that . . . the courts . . . won’t
always exclude you from . . . sitting on, you know, civic duty. They may not always select you and you may not always be needed, but . . . you can say you tried.
You showed up when you got served. [T]his side, you know, always having, again,
having looked at things from the unlawful side and then the court says, “Well, we
need you to, we need your help to make some of the right decisions.” And it’s kinda cool . . . . They said, “We’re gonna hand you this responsibility. Do you what
you need to do with it.”
See, e.g., id. at 16.
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renders one unfit to serve. Rather, participants demonstrated both the
willingness and fitness to appropriately serve as a neutral trier of fact.84
As to the “taint argument,” again, no evidence supports this claim.
Rather, evidence tends to reveal that juror diversity actually leads to
improvements in the public’s perceptions of the jury process.85 In
several prior studies, the public rated the fairness and legitimacy of the
jury and its resulting verdict more favorably when the jury was
comprised of racially or gender diverse jurors.86 In the only study of
juror diversity accounting for jurors’ prior criminal histories,
preliminary findings similarly suggest that the inclusion of those with a
felony conviction improved the public’s view of the jury and any
resulting verdict.87
In sum, empirical evidence does not support either interpretation of
the character or probity rationale for record-based federal juror
exclusion. Nonetheless, federal courts continue to cite the character
rationale as the primary purpose for the practice, even though
conceptions of character in the law vary wildly by context.
B) The Contextual Case: A Series of Inconsistencies
The law uses character as a barometer for access to various
institutions and processes.88 In virtually all instances, the law recognizes
84

This was reflected in the following study respondent’s comment:
I just said . . . “you gotta go from what you really see.” Cause, there was like two
ladies that had never been on a jury, and they were like, “We’re not gonna make
no decisions.” And, I said, “You have to go with what you see. The evidence. Everything that you get, that we’ve already been through, you have to weigh that out.
You can’t just say yes or no . . . .” I even got up and put all this stuff on the chalkboard that, the pros and cons.
See, e.g., id. at 10.
85 See generally Leslie Ellis & Shari S. Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033 (2003); Joshua
Wilkenfeld, Newly Compelling: Reexamining the Judicial Construction of Juries in the Aftermath of Grutter v. Bollinger, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2291 (2004); Robert J. MacCoun &
Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury, 12 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 333 (1989); NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT
(2007).
86 See Hiroshi Fukurai & Darryl Davies, Affirmative Action in Jury Selection: Racially
Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and Affirmative Juries of the Hennepin Model and the
Jury de Medietate Linguae, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 645, 663 (1997) (noting that in a telephone poll of California residents, 67.3% of respondents felt that a jury verdict rendered by a
racially diverse jury is fairer than one rendered by a single race jury); see generally Wilkenfeld, supra note 85.
87 See James Binnall et al., Is the Taint Real? The Perceived Legitimacy of Verdicts
Rendered by Felon-Jurors, (forthcoming 2021) (on file with authors).
88 See Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, supra note 51, at 496;
Rhode, Virtue and the Law, supra note 51, at 1027.
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the potential that character is malleable and at least in part context
specific. But in the case of federal record-based juror exclusion–and
record-based juror exclusion generally—character is ostensibly
conceptualized as fixed—forever marred once one has “chosen” to
commit a crime. Though a closer look at how the law treats character in
several other contexts calls into question the necessity of categorically
excluding those with a felony conviction from jury service for a
supposed lack of character.
If a criminal act consistently reveals flaw of character that makes
one forever unfit for jury service, then jurisdictions serious about
protecting their jury system would assuredly seek to exclude all
prospective jurors with potential character issues. This includes
misdemeanants. But that is not the case.89 Rather, misdemeanants are
permitted to serve as jurors in the vast majority of jurisdictions,90 though
as Kalt points out, a conviction for a misdemeanor infraction surely says
something about character: “While the taint from felons might be more
significant, who is to say that misdemeanants do not discredit the
institution of the jury as well? Arguing that ‘felons are felons’ is the
difference may have historical or metaphysical importance, but it may
also just be a bootstrap.”91
Similarly, if those with a felony criminal conviction would
jeopardize the jury—to the point that their outright banishment is
necessary—one would assume that verdicts rendered by juries that
include those with a felony criminal history cannot stand. But again, that
is not typically the case.92 As Kalt notes, courts are reluctant to overturn
verdicts rendered by a jury that included a juror with a felony conviction
(an “illicit” jury).93 This lack of serious remedial action in response to a

89 See Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 388-89 (2016).
90 See Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 98 MINN. L. REV. 592, 597 (2013) (“[S]tatutory provisions in thirteen states make
those with certain misdemeanor convictions vulnerable to disqualification.”). These states
are Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey,
Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. While California was listed in Roberts’ original list, the record-based juror exclusion provision was amended in 2021, making clear that
exclusion does not include misdemeanants.
91 Kalt, supra note 2, at 104.
92 Molly McDonough, Rogue Jurors, 92 A.B.A. J. 39, 43 (2006).
93 Kalt writes:
Some felons who, under the law, should be barred from jury service are not excluded, and some non-felons who should be allowed to serve are not permitted.
Many courts are surprisingly ambivalent about rectifying these sorts of errors, allowing verdicts that ‘illicit’ juries rendered to stand despite supposed concerns
about felons’ inherent bias or the threat they pose to jury probity.
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verdict rendered by those who are allegedly unfit to even take part in
jury selection begs the question, is record-based juror exclusion really
about character?
The Federal Rules of Evidence also call the character justification
into question. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence § 404(b), “Evidence
of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted
in accordance with the character.”94 The section also provides,
“Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to
prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character or trait.”95 Record-based juror exclusion uses character to
predict how one may perform as a juror – seemingly an impermissible
exercise in the evidentiary context.
Perhaps the most damning contextual argument against recordbased juror exclusion involves the licensure of attorneys.96 Today, in 24
states and in the federal court system, a citizen with a felonious criminal
history may be permitted to practice law, but is forever barred from
serving as a juror.97 Thus, those individuals who supposedly lack the
character to decide even, say, a minor property dispute in a civil matter
apparently possesses the requisite character to defend a fellow citizen in
the most grievous of criminal matters–a death penalty case.98 This
illogical contradiction highlights the law’s inconsistent conception of
character and arguably undermines the use of character as the basis for a
categorical exclusion from jury service.
In sum, what empirical evidence and contextual comparisons
demonstrate are that the underlying presumptions of the character
justification lacks support, while the use of character in other contexts
calls into question the true purpose of felon-juror exclusion. The
impeachment trials of former President Trump provide yet another
context that undermines the character justification and indirectly, the
policy of felon-juror exclusion in its entirety.

Kalt, supra note 2, at 162 (citing as an example State v. Neal, 550 So. 2d 740 (La. Ct. App.
1990)).
94 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
95 Id. at 404(a).
96 See Binnall, Convicts in Court, supra note 13.
97 Id.; BINNALL, TWENTY MILLION ANGRY MEN, supra note 7, at app. B.
98 See Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased, supra note 2, at 8-9 (noting
that Oregon is the only jurisdiction that distinguishes civil from criminal litigation for the
purposes of record-based juror exclusion, the federal court system does not).
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III. THE TRUMP IMPEACHMENT TRIALS:
CHARACTER IN ANOTHER CONTEXT
While federal criminal proceedings differ in fundamental ways
from Senate impeachment trials,99 they are similar in certain respects.
They both involve the use of jurors as triers of fact.100 Moreover, they
both involve the admonishment of those jurors prior to rendering a
decision in a given case.101
In a federal criminal trial, jurors are selected from the federal jury
pool and summoned to appear in federal court.102 On their day of
service, federal jurors must demonstrate their eligibility before partaking
in the jury selection process.103 If a prospective juror survives jury
selection, they will be seated on an empaneled jury and the presentation
of evidence will begin.104 Once the trial has concluded, the trial judge
will then ask each juror to swear an oath: “Do each of you solemnly
swear [or affirm] that you will well and truly try, and a true deliverance
make in, the case now on trial, and render a true verdict according to the
law and the evidence, so help you God?”105
In an impeachment trial, the U.S. Senate determines the contours of
the proceedings. Under Article I of the U.S. Constitution, “The Senate
shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”106 Article I
continues, “When sitting for that Purpose, they [the Senate] shall be on
Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried,
the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted
without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.”107
Accordingly, at the start of all impeachment trials, Senators swear an
oath as jurors in the matter.108 That oath, first established in 1798,109
reads: “I solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that in all things
appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of——— ———, now
99

See John Kruzel, Five Ways Trump’s Impeachment Differs from a Court Trial, HILL
(Nov. 5, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/3A8V-T92K; see also Vikram D. Amar et al.,
The Power to “Try” “Cases of Impeachment” 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 455, 467-68 (2021).
100 See PROC. AND GUIDELINES FOR IMPEACHMENT TRIALS IN THE S., S. Doc. No. 93-33,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1986); ABA, Trial by Jury, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS,
pt. 4, § 15-4.1, https://perma.cc/6FA8-TUFP.
101 S. Doc. No. 93-33 at 26; ABA, Trial by Jury, supra note 100.
102 See Learn About Jury Service, U.S. CTS., https://perma.cc/NF9G-C55E (last visited
Jan. 11, 2022).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 FED. JUD. CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 269 (6th ed. 2013).
106 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
107 Id.
108 See S. JOURNAL, 5th Cong., 2d Sess. 438-39 (1798).
109 Id.
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pending, I will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and
laws: So help me God.”110
Not only is the juror’s oath in federal criminal trials similar to that
employed in impeachment proceedings, so too are the purposes for the
pledge in each context.111 As the Tenth Circuit notes, in federal criminal
trials, “[T]he principle behind the exercise is sound: A juror impressed
with the seriousness of his charge is more likely to be attentive at trial
and, in turn, more likely to carry out his duty faithfully, with due respect
for the ideals underlying the criminal process.”112 Similarly, in
impeachment proceedings:
In mandating that the senators swear an oath before “sitting” in
trial, the Constitution signals a shift in their status. When
senators try impeachments, they are no longer legislators
deliberating on bills, but rather judges and jurors. The Senate’s
own requirement of “impartial justice” underscores the
significance of the changed role. Legislators engage in all
manner of partisan activity in order to achieve their preferred
political outcomes. As impartial judges and jurors, by contrast,
senators are meant to set their partisan inclinations aside.113
Taken together, the juror oath–in the federal criminal trial and
impeachment contexts–rests on a central principle that sworn jurors will
faithfully do their duty.114 The respective oaths then are simply a
“promise to carry out their charge—to render a verdict in accordance
with the evidence—conscientiously and impartially.”115 Speaking to the
role of senate jurors and differences/similarities between traditional
criminal trials and an impeachment trial, one scholar surmises:
Many historians treated the impeachment trials of US Presidents
in the Senate both as a trial and at the same time they insisted
that the trial was a political proceeding. It was political since the
Senate determines for itself the meaning given to what will
constitute a “high crime and misdemeanor.” Yet, it was still a
trial because, like jurors in criminal trials, the Senators take an
110 RULES OF PROC. & PRACT. IN THE S. WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACHMENT TRIALS, supra
note 28.
111 See id.; ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., HANDBOOK FOR TRIAL JURORS SERVING U.S.
DIST. CTS. (2012).
112 United States v. Turrietta, 696 F.3d 972, 978 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v.
Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1358 (6th Cir. 1984)).
113 Amar et al., supra note 99, at 466.
114 See RULES OF PROC. & PRACT. IN THE S. WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACHMENT TRIALS, supra note 28, at 182; ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., supra note 112, at 6.
115 Turrietta, 696 F.3d at 978.
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oath to try the President fairly. Presumably this at least means
that Senators are finally responsible to their constituents for
making factual findings that support whether a President has
committed a “high crime and misdemeanor.” While conducting
a political trial has always been a difficult balancing act for the
world’s “most famous deliberative body,” following the two
Trump impeachment trials, the Senate’s processes for impeachment are now in shambles, and its integrity has been
substantially damaged.116
A) Senate Jurors Speak: Trump Impeachment #1
On January 16, 2020, the first impeachment trial of former
President Trump began.117 It was the first since the impeachment trial of
former President Clinton in 1999.118 The trial concerned two counts:
abuse of power and obstruction of Congress.119
Prior to the start of the first Trump impeachment trial, a number of
Senators expressed their feelings about the charges, the process, and
their role in that process.120 For some, these statements also included a
stated verdict preference, arguably in direct conflict with their oath to
render “impartial justice.”121 For example, when asked about the
impeachment process in the lead up to the start of the trial, Senator
Lindsay Graham (R) of South Carolina stated, “This thing will come to
the Senate, and it will die quickly, and I will do everything I can to
make it die quickly.”122 When he was asked whether he felt it
appropriate to voice his verdict preference prior to the start of trial he
noted, “Well, I must think so because I’m doing it. I am trying to give a
pretty clear signal I have made up my mind. I’m not trying to pretend to
be a fair juror here. What I see coming, happening today is just a
partisan nonsense.”123 Graham made these statements on December 14,

116 Paul J. Zwier, Impeachment Trials After Trump: More Trial and Less Politics 1-2
(May 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/LCN2-7TFY.
117 Timeline: The Long Road to Trump’s Impeachment and Trial, REUTERS (Feb. 5,
2020, 11:47 AM), https://perma.cc/L73P-S3DU.
118 Sarah D. Wire, A Look Back at How Clinton’s Impeachment Trial Unfolded, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 16, 2020, 5:28 PM), https://perma.cc/6RBD-S4CB.
119 Timeline: The Long Road to Trump’s Impeachment and Trial, supra note 117.
120 Veronica Stracqualursi, ‘I’m Not Trying to Pretend to be a Fair Juror Here’: Graham
Predicts Trump Impeachment will ‘Die Quickly’ in Senate, CNN POL. (Dec. 14, 2019, 2:48
PM), https://perma.cc/NG8T-77VE; Kelsey Snell, McConnell: ‘I’m Not Impartial’ About
Impeachment, NPR (Dec. 17, 2019, 3:06 PM), https://perma.cc/X8UP-MHHQ.
121 See Stracquarlursi, supra note 120.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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2019, a full month before the start of the first Trump impeachment
trial.124
The Senate Majority Leader, Mitch McConnell (R) of Kentucky,
similarly suggested that he had decided the case and intended to work
with the President’s legal team to move toward a swift conclusion to the
impeachment trial he viewed as unnecessary: “Everything I do during
this, I’m coordinating with White House Counsel. There will be no
difference between the President’s position and our position as to how to
handle this.”125 McConnell went on to seemingly implore members of
his caucus to likewise discount their oath and predetermine their
preferred outcome: “We know how it’s going to end. There’s no chance
the president’s going to be removed from office. My hope is that there
won’t be a single Republican who votes for either of these articles of
impeachment . . . .”126 These statements were made in mid-December
2019, nearly four weeks prior to the start of trial.127
Other Senators took actions and made statements that again appear
to contradict their oath.128 Senator Mike Lee (R) of Utah worked with
former President Trump’s impeachment lawyers in their preparation for
trial. “Lee has been coordinating with Trump and his legal team for
weeks and told the publication that he started thinking about how to
handle an impeachment trial as soon as Democrats won the House
majority.”129 Lee went on to predict how the Senate would vote, flatly
characterizing acquittal as a foregone conclusion: “And you know what
we’re going to do? We’re going to embarrass the heck out of the
Democratic Party because they’ve been an embarrassment in the way
they’ve handled this. The president’s going to win and win in a big
way.”130
Ahead of the first Trump impeachment trial, statements indicating
an intention to flout the Senate juror’s oath were not confined by
political party membership.131 Senator Elizabeth Warren (D) of
Massachusetts, an attorney, former law professor, and then-presidential

124

Id. Trump’s impeachment trial began on January 16, 2020, nearly one month after
Graham’s statements. Meg Wagner, at al., The Senate Impeachment Trial Has Officially
Started, CNN POL. (Jan. 19, 2020, 9:27 PM), https://perma.cc/2DT4-XDU6.
125 Savannah Behrman, McConnell: In ‘Total Coordination’ with White House for Impeachment Trial, USA TODAY (Dec. 12, 2019, 11:55 PM), https://perma.cc/9YQB-WA84.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See Denis Romboy, Sen. Mike Lee Quietly Working to Clear Trump in Senate Impeachment Trial, DESERT NEWS (Dec. 27, 2019, 11:05 AM), https://perma.cc/JK5L-J3SL.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See Lim & Simonson, supra note 25.
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candidate indicated that she had already come to a conclusion on the
case:
I think the evidence is clear. When Donald Trump released the
transcript in which he solicited a foreign government to interfere
in the 2020 elections, he broke the law and he did that in context
of already having interfered with an investigation into the 2016
elections and Russia being invited to interfere in our elections.132
These Senator’s statements–a sampling of those made ahead of the
2019 presidential impeachment trial–strongly suggest that a number of
Senators failed to take seriously their commitment to rendering
“impartial justice.” Nonetheless, former President Trump was acquitted
in his first impeachment trial–with Senator Mitt Romney (R) of Utah,
the only Republican Senator to convict.133
B) Senate Jurors Speak: Trump Impeachment #2
In January 2021, former President Trump was once again
impeached, this time for inciting an insurrection.134 The Senate
impeachment trial for this matter began on February 3, 2021, again with
a number of Senators publicly acknowledging their verdict preference
ahead of trial.135
On January 21, 2021, ahead of trial, the New York Times began
surveying Senate jurors’ likely verdict preferences.136 Of the 100 Senate
jurors, 36 Democrats indicated an intention to convict, while 36
Republicans indicated an intention to acquit.137 Twenty-seven Senate
jurors, a bipartisan group, did not express their verdict preference prior
to the proceedings.138 Senator Ben Sasse (R) of Nebraska was one such
Senator, stating “[a]s a juror, I’m not announcing anything now and I’m
going to be limited on what I say in advance . . . .”139 Likewise, a
spokesperson for Senator Jon Tester (D) of Montana noted, “Senator
Tester takes seriously his role as a juror in the Senate trial and will

132

Id.
See Millhiser, supra note 21.
134 See Linton et al., supra note 22.
135 See Weiyi Cai & Kenan Davis, Full List: Where Every Senator Stands on Convicting
Trump, N.Y. TIMES, https://perma.cc/N2QL-9YKS (Feb. 14, 2021).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Ben Sasse Issues Statement on Impeachment of Trump, KHGI (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://perma.cc/U3RW-XVQU.
133
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consider all the evidence before making a final decision about
conviction.”140
Still, most Senators felt it appropriate to indicate how they would
eventually vote, prior to the start of the presentation of evidence.141
Senator Ed Markey (D) of Massachusetts stated flatly, “We must
convict Donald Trump.”142 He made this declaration on February 9,
2021 at 7:45 p.m. via Twitter.143 The impeachment trial officially began
at 1:00 p.m. with a 4-hour debate about the constitutionality of the
proceedings–no evidence had been presented at the time of his tweet.144
Senators Ben Ray Luján (D) of New Mexico and Debbie Stabenow (D)
of Michigan made similar declarations prior to trial. Luján stated, “The
Senate now has the constitutional duty to act, and I will stand up for our
republic, defend our democracy, and vote for removal.”145 Stabenow
stated, “When the article of impeachment comes before the Senate, I
intend to support removing Donald Trump from office.”146
Of the Republican Senators who foreshadowed their verdict ahead
of trial, all suggested that they disagreed with the legality of the
proceedings, arguing that impeachment ought to be reserved solely for
those still in elected office.147 In this way, all seemingly delegitimized
the proceedings before they began. Consider this statement by Senator
John Thune (R) of South Dakota: “Our members, irrespective of what
they might think about the merits, just believe that this is an exercise
that really isn’t grounded constitutionally and, from a practical
standpoint, just makes no sense.”148 Senator Marco Rubio (R) of Florida
succinctly summed up his intentions this way: “The first chance I get to
vote to end this trial, I will do it, because I think it’s really bad for
America.”149
140

Cai & Davis, supra note 135.
Full List: Where Every Senator Stands on Convicting Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 25.
2021), https://perma.cc/Y9U4-SV9U.
142 Ed Markey (@SenMarkey), TWITTER (Feb. 9, 2021, 7:45 PM), https://perma.cc
/4KJ9-VRYX.
143 Id.
144 Kyley Schultz, Verify: Everything You Need to Know About Former President Donald Trump’s Second Impeachment Trial, WUSA 9 (Feb. 12, 2021, 6:42 PM),
https://perma.cc/X4PA-9WDY.
145 Press Release, Ben Ray Luján, Senator, Luján Statement on Impeachment of Donald
J. Trump (Jan. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/5E3D-AN97.
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Impeachment of Donald Trump (Jan. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/TXL6-T98Z.
147 Andrew Desiderio, Senate Republicans Uniting Behind Impeachment Defense,
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148 Id.
149 Kelly Hooper, Marco Rubio: It’s Arrogant to Impeach Trump, POLITICO (Jan. 24,
2021, 10:38 AM), https://perma.cc/U8AZ-3DLZ.
141

2022]

IMPEACHMENT TRIALS OF DONALD TRUMP

97

For Republicans, statements regarding the upcoming impeachment
trial were perhaps not even their most egregious deviation from the
Senate juror’s oath. A number of Republican Senators appeared to pay
little attention to the impeachment manager’s case against former
President Trump.150Additionally, some Senators went so far as to appear
slightly disruptive during the proceedings.151 One report indicated that
Senator Rand Paul (R) of Kentucky “wasn’t seen on the floor for most
of the first hour and a half of arguments though he was spotted in the
cloakroom raising up his arms and appearing to speak loudly.”152
Summing up the behavior of Republican Senators during the
impeachment trial, NBC reporter Garrett Haake noted “the intractable
nature of trying to get some of the folks in the room to actually engage
with the material and be present and take this seriously.”153
C) The Problem with Assuming
Jurors in both federal criminal and impeachment trials take an oath
to behave conscientiously and impartially.154 Their fidelity to this oath is
obviously a personal choice. Still, absent additional evidence, we must
assume that having taken the oath, a juror is aware of their
responsibilities and plans to fulfill those in pursuit of truth and justice.
As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “When a jury is sworn, it is entrusted
with the obligation to apply the law, and we in turn presume that juries
follow instructions given to them throughout the course of the trial.”155
The Eighth Circuit has taken a similar approach, “[T]his court should
and does assume that a jury, sworn by oath to follow the law, did, in
fact, do so.”156 Similarly, in January 2020, former Senator Tom Udall
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(D) of New Mexico made clear his interpretation of the senate juror’s
oath, noting “[t]o uphold our oath, we must hear all the information
before we give judgment. It’s what we owe to the American people.”157
Still, when a juror makes their intention public—their intention to
abandon their oath to remain impartial—we would err in assuming that
they will behave otherwise. In excluding citizens with felony criminal
convictions from federal jury service, we assume that those citizens will
not fulfill their obligation to abide by their oath—to assess the case
evenhandedly and to render the appropriate verdict. On the other hand,
we also assume that U.S. Senators, who swear as jurors to deliver
impartial justice in impeachment trials, will act in accordance with their
own oath, rather than “gearing up their usual political alliances.”158 And
ultimately, while we assume the worst of those individuals who have
perhaps deviated from recognized law only once, we ostensibly trust
those Senators who–on the record–tell us that they plan to flout their
oath and then behave accordingly.
The actions of Senate jurors–from both parties–in the impeachment
trials of former President Trump, add to the growing list of contextual
discrepancies that undermine the character justification for federal
record-based juror exclusion. In an impeachment trial—the most public
of all trials—Senate jurors behaving improperly threatens the legitimacy
of the proceedings. The exact concern expressed by federal courts in
upholding record-based federal juror exclusion, which is based on the
presumption that the inclusion of those with a felony conviction will
somehow de-legitimize our jury system and resulting verdicts. In this
way, exclusion based on assumptions about character and the
appearance of impropriety is illogical and inconsistent.
IV. CONCLUSION: A PLEA FOR CONSISTENCY
Though impeachment trials differ from federal criminal trials in
fundamental ways, the lessons of the Trump impeachment trials are no
less valuable. While some readers may cite the behavior of Senate jurors
as reason to re-examine the efficacy of impeachment proceedings, that is
not the central thrust of this essay. Instead, I argue simply that the
impeachment trials of former President Trump demand reflection about
the use of character assessments in decisions of access to democratic
institutions–namely the jury. The character justification for exclusion
fails when pressed empirically—it also fails when considered alongside
a variety of contexts in which we either assume that character is
157
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redeemable or, in the case of U.S. Senators, that character exists by
default.
To be clear, Senate jurors and trial jurors are dissimilar. For Senate
jurors, they are not part of an expansive jury pool, they are not subject to
jury selection procedures, and they cannot be dismissed for cause or
peremptorily. Still, both swear an oath to conscientiously and thoughtfully approach their duties. In the case of felon-jurors–proponents of
exclusion argue that a prior bad act (often only one) is dispositive of a
lack of character and an inherent bias, but in the case of U.S. Senators
who indicate an unwillingness to abide by their oath in the matter at bar,
we seemingly assume that these are politically necessary statements that
have no bearing on how Senate jurors will ultimately conduct
themselves. I only wish my fellow citizens with a felony criminal
history were afforded that same courtesy in federal criminal trials.

